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ABSTRACT 
This paper sets out to investigate the forces behind the so-called “global capital flows paradox” 
and related “dollar glut” observed in the era of advancing financial globalization. The supposed 
paradox is that the developing world has increasingly come to pursue policies that resulted in 
current account surpluses and thus net capital exports—destined primarily for the capital-rich 
United States. The hypothesis put forward here is that systemic deficiencies in the international 
monetary and financial order have been the root cause behind today’s situation. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the United States’ position as issuer of the world’s premiere reserve currency and 
supremacy in global finance explain the related conundrum of a positive investment income 
balance despite a negative international investment position. The assessment is carried out in 
light of John Maynard Keynes’s views on a sound international monetary and financial order.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world economy has experienced an impressive global boom since 2003. While the boom 
was broad based, spanning more and more countries and even reaching the euro area by 2006, it 
also carried a number of features that gave rise to puzzlement and concern. Unprecedented 
“global imbalances,” epitomized by a U.S. current account deficit that exceeded 6 percent of 
GDP by 2005, represented one major theme. Related to it, a “global capital flows paradox” was 
identified as countries in the developing world turned into net capital exporters, with surging 
reserve holdings in the form of U.S. Treasury securities. The global boom reached a critical point 
in 2007, when U.S. domestic demand growth finally slowed down. Hopes for a “decoupling” of 
the rest of the world persist in early 2008, since important emerging market economies are 
judged to be in such good shape as to be able to withstand the U.S. slowdown and sustain the 
global expansion.  
  This paper sets out to investigate the forces behind the so-called “global capital flows 
paradox” and related “dollar glut” observed in the era of advancing financial globalization. The 
hypothesis put forward here is that systemic deficiencies in the international monetary and 
financial order are the root cause of today’s situation. Furthermore, it is argued that the U.S. 
position as issuer of the world’s premiere reserve currency and supremacy in global finance 
explain the related conundrum of a positive investment income balance despite a negative 
international investment position, which in turn has deteriorated by much less than could have 
been expected given the magnitude of the United States’ trade imbalance.  
  The analysis in this paper is carried out in the light of Keynes’s views on a sound 
international monetary and financial order, which in Section 2 are contrasted with the actually 
agreed upon Bretton Woods order. Section 3 then describes some salient features and 
experiences under the post–Bretton Woods international monetary non-order and era of financial 
globalization. A brief summary of the U.S. current account deficit follows in Section 4, while 
Section 5 focuses on the developing world’s change in behavior over the 1990s and the related 
“global capital flows paradox.” The internal workings of the U.S.-led global boom are the 
subject of Section 6, which offers critiques of both the “Bretton Woods II” and “global saving 
glut” hypotheses. Section 7 then addresses the issue of the opportunity costs of the developing 
world’s paradoxical conduct under the U.S. dollar standard, questioning whether capital account   3
convertibility and financial globalization are living up to the promises that were made for them. 
Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. KEYNES’S VIEWS ON A SOUND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER, AND 
WHAT BECAME OF THEM AT BRETTON WOODS 
 
Keynes’s monetary works of the 1920s, featuring A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) and “The 
Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill” (1925) in particular, make it clear that he did not 
consider the gold standard a suitable global order that would foster global economic stability 
while at the same time allowing countries sufficient scope for addressing their respective 
domestic situations (or: national policy space). Composing the design of an ideal order for the 
postwar world in the early 1940s, Keynes observed that the gold standard only worked 
reasonably well for a brief period and for very special conditions that no longer prevailed. His 
aim was to reestablish an international monetary order for free trade and finance without the gold 
standard’s key defect of imposing deflationary adjustments on parts, or even the whole, of the 
system. His script for the envisioned new, better order “completely dethroned gold in polite 
language” and effectively “substituted bank money for gold” (Keynes 1942, p. 140).  
  Inspired by the insights that his General Theory (1936) had brought to light, Keynes was 
optimistic that the postwar era could be an era of wealth creation and rising incomes, provided 
that obstacles to free trade constraining countries’ export markets were relieved and an 
expansionist bias to global demand implanted into the global monetary order. In essence, Keynes 
wanted to disable countries to pursue mercantilist strategies but enable them to systematically 
pursue domestic demand-led growth through deliberate management of their economies instead. 
In chapter 23 of The General Theory, Keynes observed that countries faced an incentive to draw 
on measures to increase the favorable balance of trade to boost their investment and employment 
growth given their lack of non-mercantilistic policy instruments that would allow sufficient 
control over domestic policy objectives under gold standard conditions. The problem is of course 
that this strategy cannot work for the—closed!—world economy as a whole, risking that the 
response of countries with an unfavorable trade balance might impart an overall deflationary bias 
into the system.    4
  Contemplating what a new postwar order should look like, Keynes noted that the interwar 
period had provided all the unfortunate experiments of collective failure that could result when 
countries, desperately lacking better alternatives, judged that mercantilism was in their best 
national interest, featuring competitive deflation and competitive exchange depreciations, and the 
collapse of international trade and finance. Keynes feared that global current account imbalances 
that built up during the war and the corresponding concentration of gold holdings in the United 
States would impart a contractionist and deflationary bias on deficit countries and the system as a 
whole, risking a repeat of previous disasters featuring protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies.  
 His  proposal
1 was: to create a new international monetary standard and system liquidity 
that was largely detached from gold; to implant a chiefly rule-based adjustment mechanism 
toward balance-of-payments equilibrium into the new global order featuring symmetric pressures 
for adjustment on both current account surplus and deficit countries; and to create sufficient 
national policy space that would enable countries to achieve domestic stability while abiding by 
the new international rules of the game, abstention from beggar-thy-neighbor strategies in 
particular.  
  At the core of Keynes’s envisioned “International Clearing Union” was the “bancor” unit 
of account and international liquidity in the form of (overdraft) bank money. The bancor was to 
be defined in terms of, but—importantly—not convertible into, gold. In contrast to the random 
growth in the world’s gold stock, bancor supply was ultimately elastic and under deliberate 
international control. By way of design in line with national banking principles, a credit 
mechanism was to overcome the “hoarding” problem afflicting the gold standard.  
  National currencies were to have fixed parities in terms of the bancor, and member 
countries, quotas for bancor overdraft loans. Symmetry in adjustment pressures was secured, as 
both surplus and deficit countries were to pay interest on their credit or debit balances, 
respectively, and face quasi-automatic exchange rate realignments if their bancor clearing 
balances exceeded certain thresholds in terms of their defined quotas. National policy space was 
to be created through capital controls looking after the “hot money” problem while allowing 
countries to set interest rates in line with their respective domestic requirements.  
                                                 
1 See CW, Vol. 25. Arguably, Keynes’s early “clearing union” drafts most truly reflect his own vision. For a more 
detailed analysis of the evolution of Keynes’s thinking on this issue, see Bibow (2008a).    5
  Temporary international payments imbalances were thus to be smoothed by official and 
“supernational” bancor overdraft liquidity. Bancor liquidity would grow endogenously with trade 
and temporary payments imbalances, and without facing competition from either national reserve 
currencies or private short-term lending. Exchange rates were to be pegged but adjustable 
according to rules that forbid beggar-thy-neighbor-style destabilization and prescribed quasi-
automatic parity changes designed to keep trade balanced.  
  In summary, Keynes’s bancor scheme was designed to rob countries of any mercantilist 
option, but grant them national policy space to pursue deliberate national policy management 
targeting domestic stability instead, and within a symmetric and cooperative international order. 
In addition, Keynes envisioned complementary international institutions designed to secure a 
tendency toward international balance through stabilization of the international investment and 
credit cycle, fostering commodity price stabilization, and supplemental international support for 
reconstruction and development.  
  The regime actually established at Bretton Woods differed from Keynes’s vision in 
important ways.
2 Rather than being based on an internationally controlled bancor standard, the 
Bretton Woods regime established a U.S. dollar standard, granting a special status to one 
country. On the other hand, gold was only incompletely dethroned under Bretton Woods, as gold 
convertibility of the U.S. dollar remained in place, supposedly representing a check on U.S. 
control over the international dollar standard.
3 Capital controls were progressively eased over 
time, unleashing a reemerging international financial system, largely detached from proper 
international regulation and oversight.  
  As it turned out, fears of any contractionary bias stemming from the United States’ 
commercial surplus position were largely alleviated even from the outset and increasingly so 
over time, as the United States proved sufficiently flexible and creative in making dollar reserves 
available to the rest of the world.
4 At first, this occurred largely through generous official aid (the 
Marshall Plan in particular)
5, then through U.S. foreign direct investment, and, finally, through 
U.S. trade deficits. In the end, the Bretton Woods regime failed for reasons of dollar abundance 
                                                 
2 See Isard (2005) for a summary and brief historical overview.   
3 Sales of gold were limited to foreign central banks and governments and licensed private users.  
4 Note that Keynes’s infamous “final words” on “the long run,” which appeared in his last published article, referred 
to the longer-term U.S. prospects. As it turned out, he was quite right in venturing that the United States would not 
be “paralysed by the Midas touch” (Keynes 1946, p. 185).  
5 In addition, the region most in need of reconstruction established a European Payments Union to economize on its 
need for external reserves and foster intraregional trade.    6
rather than scarcity, namely, when Europe’s refusal to either accept currency revaluation or 
accumulate more dollars (in envy of the United States’ “exorbitant privilege”) put mounting 
pressure on the gold check and President Nixon responded on August 15, 1971, by cutting the 
U.S. dollar officially free from gold.  
  Europe resisted currency revaluation for fear that this would jeopardize the old 
continent’s export-oriented reconstruction and catching-up strategy. Especially, defeated 
Germany (and, similarly, Japan) relied on export-led growth throughout this period, and with 
great success. Capital flows among developed countries, apart from U.S. outflows toward 
“reconstructing” Europe, were limited, although rising over time with the emergence and growth 
of Eurocurrency markets in London. Until the 1970s, developing countries had little access to 
global finance and received capital inflows largely in the form of official aid.  
Overall, the Bretton Woods regime of pegged exchange rates and controlled global 
finance proved very successful in promoting international trade and economic growth precisely 
because the United States showed itself at ease in supplying sufficient U.S. dollar liquidity by 
pursuing domestic demand-led growth and absorbing the exports of export-led growth countries. 
In short, the United States played its role as nth country.  
Another of the regime’s key defects—namely, putting all the pressure on deficit countries 
and relieving surplus countries of any responsibility for adjustment toward global equilibrium—
thus applied only at the regional level, not at the global level. At the global level, the key-deficit-
country United States could (or, rather, had to) ignore adjustment pressures owing to its special 
status as reserve currency issuer. By contrast, at the regional level, Germany, for instance, could 
establish its (by now) long-standing tradition of running permanent trade surpluses vis-à-vis its 
European neighbors. For exchange rate realignments were not quasi-automatic, as envisioned by 
Keynes. Fearing possible disruptive impacts on free trade, the United States had favored extreme 
rigidity of parities, only to be adjusted in (undefined) cases of “fundamental disequilibrium.” In 
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3. THE POST–BRETTON WOODS INTERNATIONAL MONETARY NON-ORDER 
 
The Bretton Woods international monetary order gave way to what may be best described as a 
“non-order.”
6 Essentially, today, “anything goes” rules countries’ exchange rate policy choices. 
Moreover, since the 1970s, national financial systems had been deregulated and capital accounts 
liberalized both in older industrialized countries and a rising number of “emerging market 
economies,” a title conferred on developing countries that have actively participated in the 
process of financial globalization. Financial globalization—the integration of national financial 
systems through rising cross-border financial flows and asset holdings—was promised to deliver 
enhanced efficiency and stability through market discipline, as were floating exchange rates 
within the new “anything goes” global monetary non-order.   
  In particular, floating exchange rates were promised to increase national policy space. 
Freed from the Bretton Woods straitjacket of pegged exchange rates, countries could manage 
monetary policy in line with their respective domestic requirements. Of course, market discipline 
would help governments in making wise policy choices. And since “speculative” private capital 
flows exert a stabilizing influence over exchange rates, there was apparently no need for holding 
any official reserves, either. Should current account imbalances arise in the process, as would 
actually have to be expected in a world of vast disparities in resource endowments and income 
levels, et cetera, these could hardly be seen as imbalances in the sense of disequilibria, given that 
the wisdom of market forces naturally tends toward equilibrium at all times.  
  For, by allowing capital to flow toward its most productive use internationally, free 
capital mobility was promised to improve allocation efficiency and hence raise economic growth 
and levels of income. Capital account convertibility would facilitate portfolio diversification and 
risk sharing and enable countries to smooth consumption over time, the new market faith held 
out. All along, apparently no safeguards were needed against always stabilizing international 
capital flows, including “hot money.” The IMF itself became so excited about infallible market 
                                                 
6 As noted above, convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold was suspended in August 1971. At first, there were 
attempts to retain the system of pegged exchange rates, which ultimately failed in March 1973 when the German 
Bundesbank and other European central banks stopped buying dollars. The Rambouillet Agreement of November 
1975 then led to the amendment of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Articles of Agreement, formalized in 
the Jamaica Accords in 1976.     8
wisdom (aka “the Washington Consensus”) that it pushed for universal capital account 
convertibility to be added to its Articles of Agreement right before the time of the Asian crises.
7  
  While some countries might come to specialize in financial services in line with their 
comparative advantage in the process, this would be just another benefit of financial 
globalization. In principle, no nation seemed to enjoy any special status regarding its currency, 
national policy space, and global finance. If anything, the benefits of financial globalization 
would seem to disproportionately favor emerging markets. The countries of the developing 
world have the most to gain, it seems, both by becoming more equal in terms of policy autonomy 
and also as the natural recipients of capital inflows propelling their development and catching-up 
process.  
  Researchers have labored hard, but until now they have failed to provide any compelling 
evidence in support of these promises. If anything, evidence shows that “developing countries 
that have relied less on foreign finance have grown faster in the long run” (Prasad, Rajan, and 
Subramanian 2007). Furthermore, a recent IMF study concludes that “financial globalization has 
not delivered on the promised benefit of improved international risk sharing and reduced 
volatility of consumption in developing countries” (Kose et al. 2007). Rather than delivering any 
promised stability, the widespread perception in the developing world is that financial 
globalization yielded economic instability and insecurity instead.  
  From a Keynesian perspective, of course, there is little surprise about the experience that 
liberalized financial markets in emerging markets should also exhibit “asset market play” (so 
ably described by Keynes in chapter 12 of his General Theory). The benefit of organized 
securities markets lies in making investments that are fixed for the community as a whole and 
liquid for the individual investor. Keynes argued that, by providing liquidity to the individual 
investor, who is thereby only committed to any particular investment his or her money has 
financed as long as he or she has not subsequently sold it to someone else, organizing financial 
markets with a view to their liquidity might well ease the financing of investment and foster 
capital accumulation. On the other hand, given the veil of Keynesian uncertainty surrounding 
real investments and their financing decisions, market liquidity may well distract investors from 
                                                 
7 In April 1997, the IMF’s Interim Committee “agreed that the Fund’s Articles should be amended to make the 
promotion of capital account liberalization a specific purpose of the Fund and to give the Fund appropriate 
jurisdiction over capital movements.” See Polak (1998) and Fischer (1997).    9
trying to “defeat the forces of time and our ignorance of the future” (Keynes 1936) and instead 
focus on anticipating what average opinion might expect the average opinion to be next.  
Of course, asset-market play of the “beauty contest” type also characterizes foreign 
exchange markets—given Keynesian uncertainty about the supposed “fundamentals” 
determining exchange rates. Even ignoring the potential of market-driven fundamental 
misalignments of exchange rates, a need for foreign exchange reserve holdings reemerges here as 
soon as countries decide to smooth what seems excessive exchange rate volatility. But foreign 
exchange market volatility is inherently related to volatility in financial markets more generally, 
and the fickleness of private capital flows in particular.  
Emerging markets came to learn their lessons about financial instability by experiencing 
financial crises that caused severe economic dislocations and hardship. They learned that 
reserves could be quickly depleted when private capital flows suddenly rush for the exit. Rather 
than being the main beneficiaries of financial globalization, emerging markets seem to be both 
more prone to “speculative attacks” and contagion from their asset class, and also more 
defenseless, given the disparity in size involved when large global players take (and dissolve) 
positions in relatively small open economies with narrow markets. Suffice it to mention that the 
role of the IMF became widely seen in emerging markets as designed to bail out rich lenders 
rather than helping crisis countries, which faced austerity prescriptions through loan 
conditionality. 
  I will return to these emerging market experiences and the lessons that crisis countries 
took from them in Section 5. Before that, however, it is useful to take a look at the evolution of 
the U.S. current account position since the 1980s. The point is that in conflict with the idea that 
floating exchange rates would make countries more equal, the U.S. dollar has retained its special 
status as key reserve currency until today. In fact, U.S. dollar reserve holdings have exploded 
over the last 10 years or so. Furthermore, while orthodoxy trumpeted the supposed benefits to 
emerging market economies, it has remained conspicuously silent on the benefits of financial 
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4. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the U.S. current account balance since 1960. The turning of the 
U.S. current account surplus into a deficit between 1965 and 1971, in conjunction with rising 
short-term capital outflows, heralded the collapse of the Bretton Woods (I) order. Leaving the 
instabilities of the 1970s to one side, Figure 1 makes it clear that while the sharp rise in the U.S. 
deficit position in the 1990s had a precursor in the 1980s, its sheer magnitude reached in recent 
years is unprecedented. The figure also indicates the event that marked the beginning of the 
global capital flows paradox: the Asian crises. By motivating an important turning point in the 
behavior of emerging market economies, the Asian crises have also contributed significantly to 
the rise in global imbalances.
8  
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  While the course change in the behavior of emerging market economies in the late 1990s 
and related global capital flows paradox is the primary focus of this paper, note that today’s 
                                                 
8 Henning (2000) estimates that almost $100 billion of the rise in the U.S. current account deficit from 1996 to 1998 
was a consequence of allowing Asian and other crisis economies see their current account positions turn into 
surplus.    11
imbalances also feature some important recurring elements. These may be seen in Figure 2, 
which decomposes the U.S. current account deficit into its key sources or counterparts. While 
elevated oil prices left their negative impact on the U.S. current account after 1973, the 
emergence of a huge U.S. current account deficit in the first half of the 1980s was primarily 
driven by one factor: the United States’ role as a “locomotive” in pulling the world economy out 
of the recession of the early 1980s.  
In particular, as the Reagan administration added expansionary fiscal policy to the Fed’s 
tight money stance under Chairman Paul A. Volcker, whereas Europe and Japan got stuck with 
deflationary macro policies until much later in the decade, a GDP growth differential in the 
United States’ favor and a surging dollar resulted in a marked deterioration in its trade with its 
industrialized trade partners in Europe and Japan. In other words, the U.S. “twin deficits” of the 
first half of the 1980s mainly mirrored the lagging of Japan and Europe behind the U.S. 
locomotive.  
The situation changed in the second half of the 1980s, as the U.S. dollar depreciated 
(following the Plaza Accord), oil prices slumped, and both Japan and Europe experienced a 
belated economic boom—lasting until 1990 in Japan’s case and 1991 in Germany’s—whereas 
the United States experienced a mild recession in 1991. Accordingly, the U.S. current account 
deficit shrunk after 1986 and had even briefly disappeared by 1991 (which, however, also 
reflected foreign transfer payments in recognition of U.S. military action following the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait).  
Since 1992, the U.S. current account position with Japan and Europe has steadily 
deteriorated once again. As Japan entered a period of deflation and domestic demand stagnation 
the country’s former strategy of export-led GDP growth became one of sole reliance on exports 
to offset persistently deficient domestic demand at home. Developments in Germany have turned 
out remarkably similar, ever since the Bundesbank’s monetary overkill in response to German 
unification, joined by mindless fiscal austerity, plunged Germany into deep crisis by 1993 
(Bibow 2003).  
Since Germany exported its peculiar (“supply-side-only”) policy wisdom to its European 
neighbors through the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, creating the euro and Euroland by 1999, the 
“German disease” has spread. Subdued growth plagued much of Europe until 1997, when a brief 
boom started that owed to external growth stimuli (chiefly, the U.S. “New Economy” boom and   12
strong U.S. dollar). In September 2002, the IMF acutely observed that “external imbalances 
across the main industrial country regions widened steadily during the 1990s” (IMF 2002, pp. 
65–66), with these imbalances being “dominated by the euro area and Japan, respectively” (p. 
67).  
Meanwhile, Japan’s current account surplus climbed to $207 billion in 2007 (4.7 percent 
of GDP), increasingly driven by soaring capital income. Germany’s current account surplus 
reached some $198 billion in 2007 (or 6 percent of GDP), largely driven by a trade surplus of 
some $240 billion, reflecting the country’s title as world export champion. Diversity in current 
account positions characterizes the rest of Europe. Generally speaking, those countries that 
experienced large interest rate declines through convergence toward German levels, either during 
the 1990s or the 2000s, run sizable current account deficits today.   
 The impact of the oil price boom since 2002 represents another recurrent element in the 
U.S. current account imbalance of today. In the U.S. case, the quadrupling of the oil price added 
another $100 billion or so to the already huge and soaring deficit. On the current account surplus 
side, this factor redistributed surpluses away from Japan, Germany, and China, and toward 
Russia and other oil and commodity exporters. In Japan’s case, this factor has dampened the rise 
in its trade surplus. In the euro area’s case, the oil price boom has turned a significant current 
account surplus. ($113 billion in 2004) into an overall balanced position in recent years. The 
five-year global boom (analyzed in Section 6 below) and, more specifically, the “China factor” 
can be identified as the driving force behind the oil (and more general commodity) price boom of 
recent years.   
Figure 2 also shows the U.S. current account imbalance with China, which is the primary 
focus of debate in the United States. No doubt, since 2002 this particular imbalance has 
increased most sharply, causing rising U.S. pressure for renminbi appreciation. Most recently, 
euro area and Japanese authorities, too, have become more vocal in this regard, which seems 
somewhat hypocritical given that Japan’s and Germany’s combined current account surplus of 
some $400 billion in 2007 well exceeds China’s. Given the renminbi’s U.S. dollar peg (until July 
21, 2005) or quasi-crawling peg (since), the renminbi has seen (dampened) depreciation with the 
U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the euro, for instance. This may well constitute one factor behind the rising 
trade imbalance between Europe and China. Yet, in view of the rising U.S.-Chinese imbalance, it   13
is clear that other, and probably more important, forces must be at work too, driving China’s 
breathtaking export and GDP growth rates.  
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The next section presents the Asian crises as the turning point in the behavior of 
emerging market economies, which in addition to the recurrent elements and the “China factor” 
discussed in this section introduced some interesting new twists to developments in global 
imbalances—featuring the “global capital flows paradox.” 
 
5. EMERGING MARKETS’ COURSE CHANGE AND THE “GLOBAL CAPITAL 
FLOWS PARADOX” 
 
Figure 3 shows that 1998–99 marked the turning point in the aggregate current account balance 
of the developing world.
9 Accordingly, in the aftermath of the Asian crises, capital flows 
changed direction, ever since flowing from poor to rich countries, primarily the United States. 
The developing world’s current account surplus position has taken the form of a surging reserve 
                                                 
9 I consolidated the IMF World Economic Outlook “emerging market and developing countries” and “newly 
industrialized Asian economies” groups.    14
accumulation, primarily in the form of low-yielding U.S. Treasury securities. Former Secretary 
of the U.S. Treasury Larry Summers (2004) dubbed this constellation the “global capital flows 
paradox.” 
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  While official flows are headed north on a grand scale, net private capital flows have 
gone the opposite way since the early 1990s. More precisely, Figure 3 shows that private flows 
have reached the developing world in two strong waves since capital account liberalization 
began spreading in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first wave started in the late 1980s and 
abruptly ended in 1998; the second took off in earnest in 2002 (following years of more tepid 
flows around the time of the dot-com bubble and bust, which saw very active capital flows 
within the developed world).
10 A common element is that both waves arose in an environment of 
low interest rate policies by the Federal Reserve (Fed) in reaction to cyclical weakness in the 
U.S. economy. An important difference in the developing world’s response to the two waves was 
observed, however, in line with the shift in their aggregate current account position.  
  Generally speaking, as the first wave hit the developing world in the early 1990s, 
countries allowed real appreciation of their currencies to take place and tolerated the emergence 
                                                 
10 The net flows hide much sharper changes in gross flows. The second wave differs from the first in that gross 
private outflows from the developing world have also grown strongly since 2003.    15
of rising current account deficits, presumably because complementing domestic saving by 
foreign saving was promised to spur economic growth and development. In fact, GDP growth 
may have accelerated in the short run as capital inflows gave rise to asset price bubbles and 
consumption booms. But these gains typically proved short-lived, followed by “sudden stops” 
(or: reversals) in private capital flows, prompting financial crises and severe economic 
disruptions. Currency depreciation imposed by market forces then turned current account 
positions around. And, out of pure necessity at the start, this generally marked the return to 
export-led growth. The conspicuous fact is that countries have proved determined to maintain 
competitive exchange rates and prevent reoccurrence of external vulnerability ever since.  
In particular, when the monetary easing by the Fed in 2001–02 kicked off the second 
wave of private capital flows headed toward emerging markets, countries generally resisted 
currency appreciation by adopting an easing monetary stance in line with that of the Fed as well 
as through foreign exchange market interventions. Maintaining competitive exchange rates 
became the cornerstone of their export-led development strategies. Also, running current account 
surpluses allowed the refilling and greatly enlarging of depleted reserves—as policy space 
insurance, it would seem (and as suggested by Martin Feldstein [1999]). Apparently, experiences 
with financial instability and crises have taught the developing world the lesson that a 
competitive exchange rate may be key to sustainable growth under the existing unsafe 
international monetary (non-)order.  
  However, being sourced from both current account surpluses as well as net private capital 
inflows foreign exchange reserves have meanwhile swelled to levels judged excessive by many 
observers. Moreover, there is the issue that insurance through reserve accumulation is not a free 
lunch. So the broader issue is that current policies may not be sustainable either. In fact, at the 
start of 2008, widespread hopes for a “decoupling” of the rest of the world from the sputtering 
U.S. locomotive seemed to presume a renewed change of course on the part of the developing 
countries, supposedly in their own best interest. Before questioning the “decoupling” hypothesis, 
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6. THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE GLOBAL BOOM 
 
Since 2003, the world economy has enjoyed a span of record growth. This outcome may seem 
rather surprising for a number of reasons. First, as noted in Section 4, Japan and Germany (and 
the euro area at large), the second- and third-largest economies in the world, have become solely 
reliant on exports and have contributed correspondingly little to global demand. Second, as noted 
in the previous section, since the Asian crises, the developing world has behaved contrary to 
orthodox wisdom by running current account surpluses and exporting, rather than importing, 
capital. Third, concerns about the global economy being “out of balance” and the U.S. current 
account deficit posing a threat to global stability have been running high for many years.  
Not all observers have shared those concerns about global imbalances, however. In 
particular, proponents of the Bretton Woods II (BWII) hypothesis argued that the “imbalances” 
were an indication of a symbiosis of interests, suggesting sustainability of the boom (see Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003). In our view, the global boom was less of a surprise than it 
may have seemed at first, while scrutinizing its internal workings raises doubts about its 
sustainability.  
To begin with, there can be little doubt that the global boom was sponsored by highly 
expansionary U.S. fiscal and monetary policies (see Godley et al. 2007). In the context of the 
“2001 global slowdown,” the United States’ fiscal stance was eased by an unprecedented 6 
percent of GDP between 2000 and 2003, while the U.S. Fed cut 550 basis points off its federal 
funds target rate between January 2001 and the end of 2002, as fears of deflation were running 
high at the time. The U.S. expansion was transmitted throughout the “dollar zone” precisely 
through the developing world’s policy of maintaining a competitive exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar. Similarly, the euro area was the only major region not participating in the global 
boom precisely because the European Central Bank (ECB) refrained from following the U.S. Fed 
(easing much more “cautiously” and benignly watching the euro’s rise from the ashes of 2001), 
while the fiscal authorities were single-mindedly trying to balance their budgets (following the 
“wisdom” of the so-called Stability and Growth Pact). Neither the global boom that got off the 
ground in 2003 nor the fact that it only reached the euro area in 2006 seems much of a puzzle to 
us.   17
  Yet, the fact that long-term interest rates remained at low levels throughout the five-year 
global boom and even fell in response to Fed tightening starting in June 2004 was famously 
referred to as a “conundrum” by former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan. The explanation favored 
by both Greenspan (2007) and his successor, Ben S. Bernanke (2005, 2007), is that a “global 
saving glut” depressed global interest rates, including U.S. mortgage rates. It is true that “low” 
interest rates (as compared to the high interest rate era of the 1980s and early 1990s) were a 
global phenomenon. And it is also true that property prices increased strongly in many countries 
outside the United States. But the idea of a “global saving glut” is not a sound one.  
  Underlying the saving glut hypothesis is the loanable funds theory of interest. On this 
view, a rise in saving in much of the developing world flooded the global capital market, and the 
resulting excess of saving over investment in the capital market depressed interest rates. I have 
argued elsewhere that loanable funds theory is fatally flawed (Bibow 2001) and the saving glut 
hypothesis thus based on flawed theory (Bibow 2008a). How could “excess saving” in Asia have 
financed the U.S. boom? It was surely not any “ex ante saving” in the developing world that 
allowed the U.S. expansion to get off the ground. Nor do ex post accounting identities prove 
anything of the like.  
Rather, liquidity preference theory starts from the observation that expansion in the 
United States was made possible in the first place by dollar liquidity. Dollar liquidity spilled over 
to much of the rest of the world through the linkages referred to above in a process featuring U.S. 
spending growth in excess of U.S. income growth and soaring global imbalances. This was made 
possible to go ahead at low interest rates since both key ingredients were in place: low policy 
rates, and benign interest rate expectations held by financial market players. Both policy rates 
and interest rate expectations remained low despite rapid demand growth because of vast new 
global supply-side opportunities and generally weak pressures in labor markets.  
  In other words, a liquidity preference theoretical explanation for the “bond market 
conundrum” attributes the phenomenon to a global dollar glut arising in an environment of 
deficient demand in product markets. If “excess saving” is meant to be a synonym for deficient 
demand, do not miss that developments in product and labor markets triggered the policy and 
market responses that delivered low interest rates ruling in financial markets, and whatever may 
be the case in the imaginary classical “capital market” allegedly balancing saving and 
investment. And we may add here that even as inflationary pressures finally emerged in 2007,   18
reflecting global commodity resource constraints, bond yields stayed low as markets apparently 
judged that the global boom and the monetary policy tightening cycle were already at or past 
their peak, so that inflationary pressures would soon abate again.  
  Having offered an alternative explanation for Greenspan’s “bond market conundrum,” we 
may also point out here that a rather important oversight afflicts the BWII hypothesis, which 
claims that “global imbalances” may be sustainable due to an ongoing symbiosis of interests 
among deficit (U.S.) and surplus (developing world) countries. In this view, the developing 
world’s interest is to sell its products into the large U.S. market as a way of stimulating 
employment growth and development. The U.S. economy, on the other hand, is flexible enough 
to tolerate the resulting quasi-permanent drag on income growth given its comparative advantage 
in creating safe financial assets, which provide the collateral for the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) stock needed in the developing world to complement its vast cheap labor resources in 
export production.   
  It is helpful to recall here an imaginary experiment, courtesy of Milton Friedman, that 
nicely highlights the conditions under which the world’s ongoing imbalances could indeed be 
sustainable. Imagine that the U.S. Federal Reserve sends out a helicopter for a cash rainfall upon 
U.S. consumers. It is easy to picture U.S. consumers showing no reluctance in picking up the 
banknotes and spending them, and to an important extent, on imported goods, too. The Fed’s 
helicopter payloads thus find their way into otherwise half-empty containers returning to Asia, 
finally ending up as official reserves in the coffers of Asian central banks, which are forever 
content with holding barren pieces of paper in exchange for the products shipped to the United 
States. 
  A first qualification to this parable is that few U.S. dollar banknotes are actually shipped 
to Asia, either in containers or otherwise. So imagine instead that those banknotes are largely 
converted into electronic entries of U.S. Treasury securities. In 2003, when Treasury bills 
yielded around 1 percent (and Treasury bonds around 4 percent), reserves held in the form of 
Treasuries rather than banknotes implied only a minor qualification to our parable. It is 
becoming more of a qualification today, as Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) increasingly take 
over the job of investing excess (?) reserves for higher yields.  
I will return to this issue in a moment. But first, I shall point out a more immediately 
relevant domestic factor in the internal workings of the U.S. boom that has left some rather   19
unpleasant legacies in the United States, which are showing up today most clearly in the ongoing 
subprime mortgage crisis. I argued above that expansionary fiscal policy played an important 
role in the U.S. recovery. Furthermore, in line with rising reserve holdings in the developing 
world, the share of U.S. Treasury securities held by foreigners (primarily foreign central banks) 
has increased significantly since the 1990s. However, apart from cyclical as well as policy-
induced variation, the U.S. public debt ratio has been stable or on a mild decline since the early 
1990s—which is much in contrast to the trend rise in the household sector debt ratio over the 
same period, particularly mortgage debt (see Figure 4).  
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In fact, the rise in household sector debt—corresponding to the fall in the personal saving 
rate since the early 1990s from 7 percent of disposable income to zero in 2006—stands witness 
to the fact that the long U.S. expansion was essentially a consumer boom. This observation is 
especially true for the years after 2001, when U.S.-led global growth resumed after a brief 
slowdown. In other words, the U.S. boom was not primarily financed by public debt, sponsoring 
a global boom along the way, as in the parable above, but by private consumer debt—mortgage 
debt in particular. Whether Asian central banks (and SWFs) have ended up holding banknotes or 
Treasuries or higher-yielding assets affects the United States’ external financing cost. But the   20
essential point is that the ultimate driving force behind the boom was consumer debt. 
Developments in U.S. mortgage and property markets were key to U.S. (and global) growth, and 
to the emergence of global imbalances and their U.S. internal counterpart.   
  Following recovery of the U.S. economy from the 1990–91 recession, property prices 
began to grow faster than incomes, driven by a self-validating process of rising credit availability 
that, in turn, reflected the compound impact of monetary policy, financial innovation, regulation, 
and competition in the financial service industry. Both innovative processes and products played 
a role as banking business turned more and more toward the “originate to distribute” model, 
structured finance principles of “slicing and dicing” allowed for the re-repackaging of large 
mortgage pools into collateralized debt obligations (subsequently sold to institutional investors, 
including unregulated hedge funds, or removed from bank balance sheets via “conduits” or 
Structured Investment Vehicles [SIVs]), while the development of credit derivatives like credit 
default swaps enabled an ever less transparent, but allegedly ever more efficient, allocation of 
credit risk in the financial system.  
  In the process, mortgage origination moved increasingly outside the realm of regulation 
and mortgage credit risks apparently migrated off bank balance sheets (in avoidance of bank 
capital charges). Consumers—also those with “subprime” credit ratings—enjoyed easy access to 
mortgage finance, including “piggyback” second mortgages for home equity withdrawals, while 
banks and rating agencies enjoyed high fee incomes on off-balance-sheet business and model-
based credit risk assessments of ever more sophisticated financial instruments, respectively. All 
went well as long as property prices kept on rising, as they did until 2006, validating the low risk 
of mortgage debt and relaxation of lending standards that was the basis for easy access to 
mortgage credit in the first place. Alas, in 2006 the property price boom that had fueled the 
virtuous cumulative process finally stalled.  
  The Fed’s “easy money” policy after 2001 surely played a role in this Minskyan boom-
bust cycle, through raising the attractiveness of adjustable rate mortgages and “teaser rate” 
features in a low-interest-rate environment, for instance. Yet, the Fed only followed its mandate 
of fostering maximum employment and price stability. Back in 2001–03, the Fed eased 
aggressively in reaction to pronounced labor market weakness and deflation threats. Also, do not 
overlook here that, in order to offset the drag on U.S. GDP growth stemming from the rest of the   21
world’s reliance on U.S. spending growth, the Fed had to ease correspondingly more than would 
have been necessary in a more balanced global demand environment. It duly did.  
  And when the Fed then took its foot off the accelerator in 2004–06, property markets 
duly responded, with prices stalling in 2006 and falling nationwide by 2007. Problems started 
with the weakest link in the chain: subprime mortgages. During the boom, even borrowers who 
were unable to service their mortgages out of income could buy properties, namely, by taking out 
no-interest mortgages and relying on later refinancing at higher property values. As soon as 
property price rises failed to materialize, such mortgages became delinquent—a clear case of 
“Ponzi finance” turning sour. Accordingly, the credit risk of securities backed by mortgage 
collateral (in whatever sophisticated ways—sliced and diced, re-re-repackaged, et cetera) were 
reassessed. When it turned out that rating agencies calibrated their models on the basis of 
historical data showing a marked upward trend and excluding the possibility of nationwide 
falling property prices, the prospect of widespread bankruptcies suddenly loomed large, both 
among mortgage borrowers and their lenders. As investors realized that it was not even clear on 
whose books risks might materialize in the end, securities prices plunged across the board (in so 
far as there were any prices, as markets seize up in such events) and systemic risks surged—
calling in the lenders of last resort. Since August 2007, major central banks have engaged in 
emergency liquidity provision, as well as policy rate cuts.  
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  In the concluding section I will briefly return to the question of the extent to which these 
measures are likely to bring resolution to the ongoing financial crisis and prevent a global 
slowdown. Whether the stabilization or even trend reversal in the U.S. personal saving rate (see 
Figure 5) will come along with a benign unwinding of global imbalances also depends on the 
successful “decoupling” of the rest of the world. In contrast to the BWII hypothesis, the upshot 
of the analysis in this section is that the key driving force behind the global boom has stalled.  
 
7. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE “EXORBITANTLY PRIVILEGED” COIN 
 
The previous section pinpointed an important aspect in the internal working of the U.S. 
expansion that makes the idea of a sustainable symbiotic relationship between the United States 
and its creditors appear in a questionable light. In this section we offer some preliminary 
thoughts on the question whether the developing world may have an interest in a quasi-
permanent arrangement along BWII lines.
11  
Insurance is not a free lunch. If the developing world holds “excessive” reserves as a 
form of insurance, it is also paying a premium for its chosen coverage. It is one thing to argue 
that the developing world seems to prefer paying this insurance premium over the alternative of 
allowing exchange rate appreciation. It is another to acknowledge that they seem to prefer taking 
out insurance to secure national policy space under the existing international monetary non-
order, while alternative international arrangements that are more equitable, and perhaps more 
efficient, are also conceivable.  
Usually the size of the “insurance premium” at issue here is measured in terms of the 
yield spread between U.S. Treasuries and yields on domestic assets sold or issued by central 
banks to sterilize their reserve accumulation. Results along these lines imply only a low “fiscal 
cost” or even suggest that in developing countries with low interest rates central banks earn 
positive carry (Ginsberg et al. 2005). Measuring opportunity costs in such a way may be 
somewhat misleading, though (see also, Rodrik 2006). The exercise is begging the question what 
good there is in running a current account surplus and allowing net private capital inflows to then 
accumulate liquid foreign assets, and only to make sure the situation can continue—if it can.  
                                                 
11 Bibow (2008b) further elaborates on this issue.    23
  The irony is that, contrary to orthodox promises, for the developing world free capital 
mobility seems to require huge safety buffers in the form of low-yielding foreign assets, sourced 
from both current account surpluses and private capital inflows. Net capital exports are a far cry 
from the idea that foreign saving would augment domestic saving, thereby allowing developing 
countries to grow and develop faster. Apparently, then, foreign saving is not needed for growth 
and development. Rather, net capital exports imply that the developing world foregoe potentially 
higher domestic investment and/or consumption today, and on market terms that do not even 
offer any attractive reward in terms of future consumption. If that is the case, what is the 
developing world paying insurance for in the first place? What is the benefit in allowing foreign 
investors to participate in the catching-up process through high-yielding FDI and portfolio 
investments? 
  Arguably, access to export markets and technology transfer are the two key external 
contributors to development. And these two factors may well require FDI to work best. But 
granting FDI an important role in development is not the same thing as general capital account 
convertibility, particularly if capital account convertibility turns developing countries into net 
capital exporters while foreign portfolio investors share the rewards of their catching-up, which 
is based on (diminished) domestic saving only. Seen from this perspective, capital account 
convertibility appears a nifty mechanism for rent extraction working through the defensive 
behavior of developing countries under the existing international monetary non-order.  
  A look at the other side of the coin is revealing. Although the United States has run huge 
current account deficits for many years, its external debt ratio has stayed stable at around 20 
percent of GDP since 2001. And despite its sizable net debtor position, it continues to enjoy a 
positive investment income balance. A number of factors are behind this conundrum proper, 
including differences in the riskiness of assets and liabilities as well as a general return 
advantage in the United States’ favor. With gross assets and liabilities being a multiple of the 
negative net position, and featuring an “original virtue” effect of dollar depreciation owing to a 
leveraged “short dollar” position, valuation effects have come to play a crucial role in the United 
States’ external position. In a way, the United States seems to have found a solution to the 
challenge posed by Evsey Domar (1950) that the interest rate payable on the external debt must 
not exceed the rate of economic growth needed to keep the external debt ratio stable, and even 
for the case where the U.S. trade deficit itself would point toward a steep rise in the U.S. external   24
(net) debt ratio. This solution would seem to be unobtainable for any other country (see Kregel 
2004). 
  To be sure, part of the “exorbitant privilege” payoff may have arisen vis-à-vis other 
industrialized countries, and valuation effects may still partly reverse in future too. In any case, it 
appears that free capital mobility magnifies the benefits of reserve currency issuance and 
financial supremacy. Yet, if development does not seem to require foreign saving to supplement 
domestic saving, why should developing countries accept the short end of the stick in this zero-
sum game? 
  Compare the three possible constellations, then. Orthodox theory suggests a current 
account deficit position for developing countries, with foreign saving allegedly boosting their 
economic growth and development. Reality is of the opposite kind, featuring the “global capital 
flows paradox”—but together with “surprisingly” good growth performance based on 
(diminished) domestic saving only. While developing countries seem to find this outcome 
preferable under the current international monetary non-order, under an alternative order as 
envisioned by Keynes all countries would be under continuous pressure to run balanced external 
positions over time while having access to official international liquidity to bridge temporary 
imbalances. Arguably, Keynes’s vision provides a better benchmark by which to assess the 
developing world’s opportunity costs of insuring against risks that do not seem to come along 
with any rewards that would justify the risk taking in the first place. 
  What are the chances for a regime change along Keynes’s lines? A more immediate 
concern is whether the developing world can actually draw on its insurance in times of need and 
decouple from the United States.  
 
8. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON DECOUPLING AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
REGIME CHANGE 
 
We contrasted Keynes’s original vision of a sound postwar international monetary order with 
what became agreed at Bretton Woods. We then noted that nothing essential has changed for the 
nth country since the collapse of the Bretton Woods order in the early 1970s, as the world has 
continued to run on a U.S. dollar standard. A significant change occurred with the liberalization 
and globalization of financial markets, spreading throughout the developing world, too. The   25
paradoxical fact is that the developing world at large has turned into a net capital exporter and 
accumulator of vast low-yielding reserves, apparently as insurance against the vagaries of 
financial globalization. Rather than augmenting their domestic saving through capital imports, a 
process that was promised to accelerate economic growth and development, general capital 
account convertibility and financial globalization seem to augment the “exorbitant privilege” of 
reserve currency issuance and global financial supremacy.  
  Yet, contrary to the BWII hypothesis that “global imbalances” might be sustainable, our 
analysis suggests that the driving force underlying the symbiosis dried up in 2006–07 as the U.S. 
property boom stalled and then went into reverse. Driven by private rather than public debt, the 
debt legacies of that boom are now seen in deteriorating U.S. consumer balance sheets, with 
falling property prices inflicting their leveraged impact on net worth and creditworthiness. 
Similarly, lenders and portfolio investors exposed to the U.S. mortgage market experience the 
corresponding impact on their capital base. Apart from creating pressures for asset sales and 
deleveraging, these developments are bound to constrain new lending: a credit crunch is 
unfolding.  
  Since August 2007, key central banks have labored hard to counter market illiquidity, and 
with some success. But large-scale emergency lending is no substitute for proper balance-sheet 
repair and recapitalization of private borrowers and bank lenders. The U.S. banking system is 
under stress, as “off balance sheet” risks parked in conduits and SIVs have made an unplanned 
return onto banks’ balance sheets and write-downs are impairing the capital available to cover 
existing risks or take on new ones. Interestingly, U.S. banks (as well as the Swiss bank UBS, et 
cetera) have received recapitalization not from national public sources, but from foreign ones. 
Does the (partial) takeover of some key players of global finance turn into the latest twist in the 
developing world’s response to the threats of financial globalization? Ironically, the markets 
have so far cheered the unexpected helping hand. Not so the governments in the developed 
world, however, which have called for rules and restrictions on the investments of SWFs. 
Whatever the merit of such calls may be, I doubt that bank recapitalization through this channel 
will prove sufficient to address the scale of bank capital damage, which may come to exceed by 
far the impact of the subprime crisis that has so far been at the center of attention.
12   
                                                 
12 The IMF (WEO, October 2007) identified the drying up of foreign financing of the U.S. current account deficit 
and rising trade protectionism as the two key threats to the global economy. The above developments feature   26
  While the banking system is in need of capital base repair to avoid a full-scale credit 
crunch, it is not the only weak spot in the old BWII machinery. The U.S. consumer, too, needs a 
bailout. In early 2008, a fiscal stimulus package of some $150 billion (or roughly 1 percent of 
U.S. GDP), mainly targeting low- and middle-income U.S. households, does not seem unlikely 
to come into effect in the course of the year. While representing a move in the right direction to 
counter the ongoing slowdown in private spending, the magnitude involved will not be sufficient 
to restart the engine. Tax cuts will help to support incomes as the labor market deteriorates. But 
the underlying balance sheet problems that encourage credit tightening and thus constrain 
consumers’ cash flow remain. Note that a proper bailout (or recapitalization) of U.S. consumers 
would effectively move us to the “helicopter parable” employed in Section 5 above: replacing 
private debts with public debts. Such a consumer bailout would also establish the implicit BWII 
requirement for sustainability. However, this, too, seems unlikely to happen.  
  Therefore, with the U.S. engine having stalled for the time being, decoupling will be a 
necessary condition for sustaining global growth. Decoupling involves a reversal in global 
current account trends seen since the Asian crises. And to some extent decoupling did indeed 
happen over 2006–07. At least in the initial stage of the U.S. slowdown and current account 
improvement (as a share of U.S. GDP), global growth held up well. In early 2008, with the U.S. 
Fed in fast-easing mode, the developing world once again faces the choice to either “follow the 
leader” and ease too, or to allow their currencies to appreciate. By stimulating domestic demand, 
the former strategy would be more conducive to sustaining global growth, but in either case, 
current account positions in the developing world would tend to worsen, implying an unwinding 
of global imbalances and disappearance of the alleged “global saving glut” along the way.  
  By contrast, while this trend reversal in itself would also imply a corresponding 
slowdown in reserve accumulation from the current account source, a continued dollar glut 
nevertheless represents one possible scenario. Private capital flows toward the emerging world 
could even accelerate, particularly if the leader were not followed (turning the U.S. dollar into a 
carry trade funding currency). But then, there is also the opposite scenario. Given the buildup of 
leverage during the boom, further declines in property prices and capital impairments at the core 
of the international financial system could force widespread distress selling. By prompting 
                                                                                                                                                             
protectionism concerning financial inflows from the developing world into non–Treasury securities, indicating a 
drying up of cheap finance for the United States’ international investment position.    27
“sudden reversals” in international private capital flows, this would then provide a real test for 
the view that the developing world’s reserve holdings have become “excessive.”  
  Last but not least, we should note that there are also structural factors in the way of a 
smooth decoupling and benign unwinding of imbalances. The developing world’s export bias, 
motivated and conditioned by the existing international monetary non-order and financial 
arrangements along BWII lines, have also left their real imprint on the structure of the global 
economy. The U.S. consumer is not all that easily replaceable. The industrial production 
structures in export-oriented emerging market economies like China have developed with a view 
of, and are geared toward, the fancies of the first world. Chinese farmers simply do not have the 
means to buy what China’s industry produces for sale in high-income economies. So the 
European consumer is the only real alternative, and in 2007 Europe actually overtook the United 
States as China’s most important export market. Yet, the European consumer is unlikely to get a 
chance to step up to the bar before being crushed by the ECB.  
  These considerations are a reminder of the role that protracted domestic demand 
stagnation in Japan and Germany (and the euro area) has played in the buildup of global 
imbalances. Decoupling would seem to include a course change on their part, too. More 
generally, these considerations alert us once again to the fact that current global arrangements are 
very different from what Keynes had envisioned for the postwar world. Under his scheme, 
countries are denied the option to freeload on external growth stimuli, and are instead given the 
policy space to systematically pursue domestic stability. Ongoing changes in the global economy 
may herald the end of U.S. dollar dominance. One possibility is that a more balanced oligopoly 
of floating key currencies will come to replace the current dollar standard, with only limited 
cooperation among them. With Euroland lacking both the institutional structure and the political-
economic mindset to become a global player, China, and perhaps India, too, may come to play 
the more decisive part, equipped with instincts to stay free from foreign monetary-financial 
hegemony. In an environment of more equal global players, perhaps the time will become ripe 
for an international order along Keynes’s symmetric and cooperative lines.    28
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